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Abstract
We study the design of pension benets for male and female workers. Women live
longer than men but have a lower wage. Individuals can be single or live in couples who
pool their incomes. Social welfare is utilitarian but an increasing concave transforma-
tion of individuals lifetime utilities introduces the concern for redistribution between
individuals with di¤erent life-spans.
We derive the optimal direction of redistribution and show how it is a¤ected by
a gender neutrality rule. With singles only, a simple utilitarian solution implies re-
distribution from males to females. When the transformation is su¢ ciently concave
redistribution may or may not be reversed. With couples only, the ranking of gender
retirement ages is always reversed when the transformation is su¢ ciently concave.
Under gender neutrality pension schemes must be self-selecting. With singles only
this implies distortions of retirement decision and restricts redistribution across genders.
With couples, a rst best that implies a lower retirement age for females can be im-
plemented by a gender-neutral system. Otherwise, gender neutrality implies equal re-
tirement ages and restricts the possibility to compensate the shorter-lived individuals.
Calibrated simulations show that when singles and couples coexist, gender neutrality
substantially limits redistribution in favor of single women and fully prevents redistri-
bution in favor of male spouses.
Keywords: gender wage gap, gender gap in longevity, retirement systems.
JEL classication: H55, H31, H21.
1 Introduction
The longevity gap and the wage gap are two important factors in gender inequality,
particularly when it comes to the retirement period. On average, women outlive men
but, having earned less during their active life, they tend to have less savings when
retiring. As a result, women are at greater risk of poverty in later life than men (Policy
Department, European Parliament, 2019).
The longevity gap has been decreasing during the last decades, but it continues to be
signicant. Among OECD nations, the di¤erence in life expectancy at birth is currently
around four to six year (seven in Japan); see Goldin and Lleras-Muney (2019). Women
have not only a longer life expectancy at birth, their mortality rates at every age are
also lower. The explanation of these gender di¤erences in mortality is subject to some
debate, and there are several schools of thought, see Cullen et al. (2016) and references
within. Theories range from those stipulating a selective female survival advantage on
a hard-wiredbiologic basis to more sociological and behavioral based explanations.
Turning to the gender wage gap, the persisting and systematic gender di¤erences in
employment outcomes have been extensively studied; see Bertrand (2020) for a recent
survey. The gap in earnings is synthesized by the gender wage gap: on average, women
in the EU earn around 15 % less per hour than men (Eurostat 2020); see also Blau and
Kahn (2018).
In the EU, pension systems manage to reduce these inequalities to some extent.
Still, di¤erent earning histories and child care involvement continue to be reected in
a signicant gender pension gap. In 2019, the average female pension income was 37%
lower than that of men (European Parliament resolution of Jan.30, 2020). The redis-
tributive elements of pensions and tax systems and the coverage of unemployment spells
related to care activities mitigate the gender di¤erence in labor market earnings. The
importance of solidarity and redistribution has been recently conrmed by the Resol-
ution of 14 June 2017 on the need for an EU strategy to end and prevent the gender
pension gap. In addition, the European Parliament resolution of Jan.30, 2020 on the
gender pay gap writes: [...] in order to overcome pension gender inequalities and safe-
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guard and increase pensions in general, it is imperative that social security systems
continue to exist within the public sphere and integrate the principles of solidarity and
redistribution. As a result, in many Member States, women are still granted pension
rights for child care subject to certain conditions. The coverage or premium for child
care, gender-specic retirement ages and work experience-based eligibility conditions
continue to have an impact on the gender pension gap of some countries among both
high and low pensions.
However, this di¤erential treatment of women has been increasingly challenged by
policymakers, particularly at the EU level. Directive 2006/54/EC (following Direct-
ive 96/97/EC), promoting equal treatment in occupational social security schemes and
prohibiting (gender) discrimination, reduces the possibility to redistribute from men to
women to compensate the time that women spent in child care activities during their
working life. Specically, the Directives Chapter 2, article 9, states that Provisions
contrary to the principle of equal treatment shall include those based on sex, either
directly or indirectly, [...] for xing di¤erent retirement ages [...] and setting di¤erent
conditions for the granting of benets.Following the Directive, all Member States re-
duced the gender di¤erence in pensionable ages and pension benets. Some countries
fully implemented gender equality of pensionable ages (Austria, Belgium, Denmark and
Germany, among others); some other countries apply derogations in accordance with
Article 141(4) of the Treaty and continue to compensate for women for the time they
spent raising children (for example Bulgaria, France, Italy, Lithuania, Slovenia).1
Despite the relevance of this subject and the ongoing debates about pension reforms
in many Member States, the underlying gender issues have received very little attention.
Consequently some fundamental questions are currently not well understood. This
is a serious omission because these problems are crucial in an aging society, where
gender equality is becoming a key concern. Specically, there is little guidance to what
1DIRECTIVE 2006/54/EC states that [...] the principle of equal treatment does not prevent Mem-
ber States from maintaining or adopting measures providing for specic advantages in order to make
it easier for the under-represented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for
disadvantages in professional careers. Given the current situation and bearing in mind Declaration No
28 to the Amsterdam Treaty, Member States should, in the rst instance, aim at improving the situation
of women in working life.
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would be the appropriate direction and extent of redistribution between men and
women in a society where women live longer but have lower labor incomes. Bommier
et al. (2011) provide some partial insights by studying pension design when individuals
di¤er in life-spans. However, they assume that all individuals have the same earning
opportunities which means that their analysis cannot directly be applied to gender issues
where the wage gap is signicant. Furthermore, they do not account for the possibility
that individuals may form couples and pool their resources.
Another open questions concerns the implication of equal treatmentrules requiring
gender neutrality of the pension scheme. Though appealing from a horizontal equity
perspective, this is similar to no tagging conditions which have been studied in the
optimal taxation literature; see for instance Cremer et. al (2012a). We know from this
literature that imposing gender neutrality in a society where men and women di¤er in
crucial characteristics like life expectancy and earning opportunities necessarily reduces
overall welfare. But an interesting open question is how this requirement a¤ects pension
design, the induced allocation and particularly gender gaps in retirement ages and the
extent of redistribution. Gender neutrality clearly comes at a cost and the relevant issue
it then to know how much ine¢ ciency a government must be ready to concede (at least
in the short run) to promote the objective of gender parity in pensions.2
Our analysis aims at improving our understanding of these issues. We assume that
men and women choose their retirement ages given the pension scheme. We determine
the pension scheme that maximizes welfare accounting for individuals decisions. Women
live longer than men but have lower earning opportunities. Gender and retirement ages
are publicly observable, while individual consumption levels are not. This constraint is
irrelevant when there are only singles, but it imposes a restriction with couples because
2Gender neutrality and other non-discrimination rules are common in insurance markets and in regu-
lated industries. In private (imperfectly competitive) markets these rules are not necessarily ine¢ cient.
However, in the case of insurance policies, they amount to introducing adverse selection in markets
which would otherwise yield actuarially fair contracts (and full insurance). Finkelstein et al. (2009)
for instance, study the e¢ ciency cost and the redistributive impact of banning gender specic annu-
ity pricing in the UK. While their exercise bears some similarities with our paper it di¤ers in several
crucial aspects. In particular, they consider private markets where averse selection brings about Roth-
schild and Stiglitz or similar types of equilibria while we consider social insurance where the objective
is redistribution. In addition, they do not consider couples.
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the allocation of resources between spouses cannot be controlled. The solutions we refer
to as rst best (FB) is then e¤ectively a constrained FB.
In the rst part, we study the desirable direction of gender redistribution for singles
and for couples. When individuals di¤er in their life-spans the denition of social welfare
is both crucial and not trivial. A simple utilitarian welfare function fails to capture
the possible concern for redistribution between long-lived and short-lived individuals.
Indeed, it e¤ectively puts a higher weight on the longer lived since their instantaneous
utilities are added over more period. The specication of welfare we use is inspired by
Bommier et al. (2011). Social welfare is utilitarian in that it is additive and puts the
same weight on all individuals. However, the sum is taken over an increasing concave
transformation of individuals lifetime utilities. The concave transformation reects
societys aversion towards multiperiod inequality (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 1982,
and Gottschalk and Spolaore, 2002) or risk aversion with respect to the life duration
(Bommier, 2006).
With singles only, and absent of a concave transformation, redistribution from men
to women is always optimal. In rst best, men retire later and have a lower lifetime
consumption. This is because per-period consumption is the same for all, while men
have a shorter life-span. As a result, women receive a pension which exceeds their
contributions while the opposite is true for men. When the transformation is su¢ ciently
concave, redistribution may be reversed but the possibility that there continues to be
redistribution from men to women cannot be ruled out even in the Rawlsian case when
wages are su¢ ciently di¤erent.
The existence of couples does not a¤ect the solution when no concave transformation
is applied. However, it di¤ers as soon as the transformation exhibits some concavity.
Because of the consumption pooling, redistribution between gender can be achieved only
via the retirement age. The concave transformation then has a more drastic impact
on retirement ages than in the singles case. In particular when the transformation is
su¢ ciently concave the ranking of the desired male and female retirement ages is always
reversed, irrespective of the size of the wage gap.
In the second part of our analysis we introduce gender neutrality so that pension
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schemes cannot be explicitly conditioned (tagged) on gender. Formally this amounts
to imposing a self-selection constraint: the government will o¤er a menu of incentive
compatible pension schemes and men and women will choose the preferred one. The
solution then depends on the pattern of binding incentive constraints.
With singles only, when the FB implies redistribution from men to women, gender
neutrality entails distortion of the female retirement age. As in optimal tax models,
the sign of the distortion depends on the comparison between the marginal rates of
substitution of the mimicker and the mimicked. When wages are not too di¤erent
female retirement age is reduced (compared to the FB). However, since indi¤erence
curves may not be single crossing, other patterns of distortions may arise.
When all individuals live in couples, gender neutrality may have an even more drastic
impact. As long as the FB implies a lower retirement age for female partners, it can
be implemented by a gender neutral pension system. However, a solution in which
women retire later than men can no longer be implemented. Consequently when the
transformation applied to utilities is su¢ ciently concave the gender neutral solution
implies pooling and thus equal retirement ages. In that case gender neutrality restricts
the possibility to compensate the shorter lived individuals.
Our theoretical analysis is completed by numerical simulation based on a calibrated
model. The numerical results illustrate our analytical result and show which of the cases
discussed are likely to arise with empirically relevant parameter values both for the FB
and for the gender neutral second best. They also allow us to quantify the size of the
overall welfare cost imposed to society by gender neutrality, as well as its impact on the
di¤erent segments of the population: male and female singles and spouses. In addition,
we also consider the more realistic case where singles and couples coexist. Since the
policy can be conditioned on the marital status (there is tagging to this respect) this
wont a¤ect the qualitative results obtained within each group. However, there is now a
global budget constraint allowing for cross subsidies among single individuals and mar-
ried individuals. It is well known from the optimal tax literature that analytically these
transfers cannot be signed except under very restrictive assumptions; see for instance
Cremer et al. (2012b). However, the numerical solution of the calibrated model provides
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us with an empirically meaningful estimation of the directions of transfers. Last but not
least, the numerical results provide a more explicit description of the pension schemes
(both marginal and total).
2 The Model
Preferences over consumption c and labor `, of an individual of age t can be expressed
by an instantaneous utility function V (t) assumed to be additively separable:
V (t) = u (c (t))  r (t) ` (t) ;
where r (t) represents the instantaneous intensity of labor disutility. Utility of con-
sumption u(c) is strictly increasing and concave, while r(t) is an increasing and convex
function so that disutility of labor increases with age at an increasing rate, reecting
for instance a declining health status.
We concentrate on labor supply at the extensive margin using the following restric-
tion: ` 2 f0; 1g. At any moment in time, individuals can either work a given number of
hours, normalized to one, or not work at all, that is retire. Given that r(t) is increasing,
V (t) can be rewritten as
V (t) = u (c (t))  r (t) if t   (1)
= u(c(t)) if t > ;
where  denotes the retirement age, i.e. the length of working life.
Let date 0 denotes entrance to the labor force and T the maximum life-span. The
interest rate and the discount factor are constant, equal and normalized to 0. Lifetime











Separability between utility from consumption and disutility from labor, concavity of
the instantaneous utility function, perfect capital markets and certain lifetimes all to-
gether imply that individuals will set their level of consumption equal in all periods.
6
Consequently, lifetime utility can be rewritten as
U = Tu(c) R(); (3)
where R() =
R 
0 r(t)dt is the lifetime disutility from labor.
We consider a population with men and women born in equal proportions. Indi-
viduals may remain single or form couples. In the analytical part, we concentrate on
the cases where all individuals are singles or where they all live in couples. The results
would not change if both types of living arrangements were to coexist, as long as the
policy can be tagged on the marital status. We illustrate this case through a numerical
example in Section 6.
Throughout the paper we concentrate on a single generation in the steady state
with a stationary population. Since the population growth rate and the interest rate
are equal, in the model funded and pay as you go pension systems are equivalent.
Singles. Utility of a single individual of gender j = f;m, female or male, is given by
U sj (cj ; j ;Tj) = Tju(cj) R(j): (4)
Given retirement age j , an individuals lifetime labor income is wjj ; where wj
reects labor market conditions. Recall that women currently earn on average 15% less
than man and live on average 4 to 6 years longer.3 Consequently, we assume that
Assumption 1: wf  wm and Tf  Tm:
We refer to w and T as the degrees of gender wage and life-span heterogeneity in
the society. To concentrate on redistribution across genders we assume that each group
is homogenous: all men are characterized by the same wage and life-span and the same
for women.4
3Longevity and income are positively correlated and the gender gap in longevity decreases with
education and other socioeconomic characteristics (Bohàcek et al, 2020). Sheshinski and Caliendo
(2021) study the design of a progressive pension system when individuals with larger income also live
longer. They disregard gender gaps and the direction of desirable redistribution is obvious in their case:
from high-income/long-lived individuals to low-income/short-lived ones.
4Both women and men in the EU can expect to live in good health until the age of 64 (European
Institute for Gender Equality, 2019). Given that no specic gender gaps in health are observed for
individuals in working age, we assume that the function R() is the same for both genders; see also
Britton and French (2020).
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Following Becker et al. (2005) we assume that utility when dead is normalized to
zero and that for a given level of lifetime resources, individuals are always better o¤
when living longer for any given retirement age  < T , which requires :




Couples. We assume that couples are unitary and maximize the sum of spouses
utilities, so that they pool their resources. The utility of a couple is thus given by
U c (cf ; cm; f ; m;Tf ; Tm) = Tfu(cf ) + Tmu(cm) R(m) R(f ): (5)
We assume throughout the paper that a couplesallocation of consumption across
spouses is not publicly observable. Consequently, couples will always allocate their
resources Ic so as to maximize Tfu(cf ) + Tmu(cm) subject to Tfcf + Tmcm = Ic, which
implies cf = cm = c. In other words, spouses instantaneous consumption levels are
always equalized. This assumption also applies to the allocation referred to as FB and
which is thus, e¤ectively, a constrained FB. This allocation is the relevant benchmark
to infer the direction of redistribution and to assess the second-best allocation achieved
under gender neutrality.
3 The laissez-faire
3.1 Retirement decision of singles







where the superscript s refers to single. Substituting csj = wj
s
j =Tj into (4), the












Men and women di¤er in wages and in their life-span. To compare their retirement

















is the second-order condition. In words, when two single individuals have the same
wage, the one with a longer life-span will retire later.
While the e¤ect of T is simple and unambiguous, the wages have a more complex





















where "(csj) is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of individual j. Recall that,
from Assumption 1, Tf  Tm and wf  wm: In addition, from (8), dj=dTj > 0: Two
cases are then possible:
"(csj) > 1 )
dsj
dwj
> 0 and  sf 7  sm ;
"(csj)  1 )
dsj
dwj
 0 and  sf >  sm :
In words, when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is smaller than 1, women
always retire later than men in the laissez-faire. However, when the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution is larger than 1 then (8) and (9) are of opposite sign and the
comparison between retirement ages is ambiguous and depends on which e¤ect prevails.
This in turn depends on the relative magnitudes of T and w. The case where women
retire later is more likely to occur when T=w is relatively high, whereas men are
more likely to retire later when when T=w is low.
Male and female consumption levels are most easily compared when  sf < 
s
m . In
that case, it follows directly from the budget constraint (6) together with Assumption
1 that csm > c
s
f . The female single has a lower lifetime income and lives longer so
that her consumption level must be lower. Interestingly we also obtain a lower female
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consumption even when  sf > 
s
m . From (7) we then have
R0( sf )
wf





implying again csm > c
s
f :
3.2 Retirement decision of couples

















0(cc) = R0(f );
so that  cm > 
c
f . As anticipate after expression (5), the couples disposable income is
equally shared between spouses, but men retire later than their partners.5 We observe
cross-subsidies (or redistribution) from men to women.6
The results obtained so-far are summarized in the following proposition.




2) When "(csj)  1, single women retire later ( sf >  sm ) than single men. When
"(csj) > 1, single women may retire later or earlier than single men.




but men retire later than their spouses  cm > 
c
f .
Note that the resource pooling along with the absence of uncertainty implies that
womens inheritance of pension rights is perfect and there are no poor widows: married
5All women are employed in our model. Housewives could be incorporated by letting wf tend to
zero, which would imply a corner solution for the retirement age of female spouses.
6The assumption that spouses enter the labor market at the same age implies that they have the
same age. Di¤erences in spousesage can be incorporated in the model by changing the longevity gap
T: Specically, an increase in the longevity gap would capture the situation in which female spouses
are younger than their partners.
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women have a constant consumption ow over time, extending into widowhood. In our
setting poor single womenare more relevant and are likely to represent the target of
redistribution.
4 First best
The government maximizes the following social welfare function:
SW = ' (Uf ) + '(Um);








1  ; j = f;m: (10)
In this specication  measures the degree of concavity of '. A larger level of  implies
a larger degree of inequality aversion. Special cases include the traditional utilitarian
solution (linear ') for  = 0, and a Rawlsian welfare function for  ! 1. When '
is linear we return to an utilitarian welfare and there is no concern for redistributing
between individuals of di¤erent life-spans. The only redistributive concern is the one
across income levels which is brought about by the concavity of U . A strictly concave
' introduces a countervailing e¤ect tending to compensate men for living a shorter life
and, when in couples, also for retiring later.
The resource constraint is imposed for the considered generation. Since the economy
is stationary and the population growth and the interest rate are both zero, this is
equivalent to imposing a per periodbudget constraint in an overlapping generations
model.




The Lagrangian expression associated with the maximization of social welfare is given
by





m   Tfcsf   Tmcsm]: (11)
Rearranging the FOCs, presented in Appendix B, yields
R0( sFBj )
u0(csFBj )
= wj for j = f;m; (12)
u0(csFBf )'
0(U sFBf ) = u
0  csFBm '0(U sFBm ): (13)
We prove the following Proposition in Appendix C.
Proposition 2 (FB allocation with singles) The rst best allocation is described by
(12) and (13) and always implies U sFBf  U sFBm and csFBm  csFBf .







(ii) When ' is Rawlsian, we have  sFBf > 
sFB
m if wm = wf and Tf > Tm.
(iii) When ' is Rawlsian we have  sFBf < 
sFB
m if wm > wf and Tm = Tf :
Two general properties emerge from the rst-best allocation. First, women always
benet from a higher life cycle utility than men (except of course in the case where ' is
Rawlsian in which case U sFBf = U
sFB
m ). Second, men always benet from a per period
consumption that is at least as large as that of women. The implications of these results
for the redistribution across gender will become clear in the next subsection where we
study the implementation via a pension system.
4.1.2 Implementation
Omitting superscript s to alleviate notation, the pensions system applied to singles is
represented by the net benet functions Pj(j). It indicates the pension received minus
12








= wj + P
0
j(j): (14)
Implementing the FB thus requires P 0(j) = 0; the pension scheme is atin the sense
that there is no marginal distortion of the individual pension decision. The level of PFBj
then follows from the individual budget constraint:
PFBf = Tfc
FB
f   wfFBf ;
PFBm = Tmc
FB
m   wmFBm :
Note that PFBf +P
FB
m = 0 so that redistribution from men to women entails P
FB
f > 0 >
PFBm . In words, women receive pension benets exceeding their overall contributions
while the opposite occurs for men. We are now in a position to discuss the redistributive
implications of Proposition 2.
When ' is linear, the government is only concerned about redistribution between
agents with di¤erent yearly labor income. As a result, both men and women receive
the same consumption level and women retire earlier. Since women live longer, this
can only be achieved by redistribution from men to women so that P sFBf > 0 > P
sFB
m
(point (i) of Proposition 2).
Consider now the case where ' is strictly concave so that the government is also
concerned about redistribution from short to long-lived agents. When wages are equal
(wf = wm) we return to the setting considered by Bommier et al. (2011) and we know
from (13) that csFBf < c
sFB
m as soon as ' is strictly concave, so that it certainly holds
in the Rawlsian case. From equation (12) this implies  sFBf > 
sFB
m . Consequently to
achieve UFBf = U
FB
m , as implied by the Rawlsian solution we must have P
sFB
f < 0 <
P sFBm . This shows that when wages are equal the direction of redistribution is e¤ectively
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reversed at the Rawlsian solution. By continuity this property continues to hold when
' is su¢ ciently concave. Similarly it continues to hold when yearly incomes are not
too di¤erent. But when wf is much smaller than wm, we can no longer conclude. In
that case we cannot rule out the possibility that even in the Rawlsian case we have
P sFBf > 0 > P
sFB
m . Note that this is necessarily true when wf is close to zero while wm
is su¢ ciently large. These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (FB pensions with singles) With a utilitarian SW function redis-
tribution from men to women is always optimal. When the transformation of the SW
function is su¢ ciently concave, redistribution may be reversed. However, the possibility
that redistribution from men to women remains optimal cannot be ruled out, even in the
Rawlsian case, when the wage gap is su¢ ciently high.
4.2 Couples
We now turn to the case where all individuals live in couples. As mentioned above




c.7 The social planner maximizes
SW = ' (Tfu(c
c) R(f )) + '(Tmu(cc) R(m)) (15)
subject to
wmm + wff   (Tf + Tm)cc = 0: (16)






0(cc)  (Tf + Tm) = 0; (17)
@L
@f
=  '0(Uf )R0(f ) + wf = 0; (18)
@L
@m
=  '0(Um)R0(m) + wm = 0: (19)
7This assumption is made to concentrate on pension design. The unrestricted FB would in general
require di¤erent consumption levels. However since couples pool their ressources, this solution can
only be implemented when benets are conditioned not just on retirement ages but also on spouses
consumption levels. In other words, the pension system would have to be associated with an implicit or
explicit tax on spousesconsumption levels. But this is ruled out by our assumption that the allocation
of disposable income within a couple is not publicly obsevable.
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 cFBf < 
cFB
m :
Thus we have redistribution from men to women and the female spouse is better o¤.
Note that unlike in the singles case the FB coincides with the laissez-faire. The equaliz-
ation of consumption levels, which in the singles case required transfers, is automatically
achieved with couples because they pool their resources.8
When '00 < 0 the solutions with singles and couples di¤er. This follows because
couples pool their incomes so that ccf = c
c
m = c
c applies by denition, while consumption
levels will in general di¤er for singles. Formally this is as if we impose an extra constraint
so that social welfare with couples will be lower. It also means that the results of




































From this condition we obtain the following Proposition (see the proof in Appendix D).
Proposition 4 (FB allocation with couples) A rst-best allocation is described by
(20) and (21).
(i) It always implies U cFBf  U cFBm irrespective of the degree of concavity of '.






m always obtains when
' is su¢ ciently concave.
8And in this case our constrained FB is e¤ectively the same as the unrestricted FB, given that the
latter requires equal consumption levels anyway.
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In words, in the FB, the female spouse is always better o¤ than the male irrespective
of the concavity of the transformation '. But this does not tell us anything about the
spousesretirement ages. Recall that in the laissez-faire and in the FB with linear ',
women always retire earlier than man. We now examine if we can have f > m when
' is su¢ ciently concave. With the Rawlsian welfare function SW = min[Uf ; Um]; the
solution implies U cFBf = U
cFB
m . The interesting result is that, with couples, U
cFB
f =




f . This was not necessarily true with singles
only but since spouses pool their incomes and women live longer, utilities can only be
equalized when men retire earlier. By continuity  cFBm < 
cFB
f also obtains when ' is
su¢ ciently concave. To sum up, in the case with couples only, we can say for sure that
the ranking of gender retirement ages is reversed when ' is su¢ ciently concave.
4.2.1 Implementation





m) because this showed the direction in which the system redistributes. With
couples only, the levels of the pensions are no longer relevant for the redistribution
between spouses. Recall that couples pool their resources and their total net pension is
by denition always equal to zero (see below). Hence, with couples only, redistribution
can only take place via the retirement ages. These in turn depend on the derivative of
the benet function P cj (
c
j ), j = f;m: A couple maximizes
(Tf + Tm)u(c














m)  (Tf + Tm)cc = 0;
where P cf (f ) + P
c
m(m) = 0 because we have identical couples. Omitting superscript c














which are the counterparts to expression (14) in the case of singles. Using the FOCs
(20) and (21) and after some rearrangement, we obtain that the implementing benet
function must satisfy





0(U cFBm )  '0(U cFBf ))
'0(U cFBf )(Tf + Tm)
#
(25)






0(U cFBf )  '0(U cFBm ))
'0(U cFBm )(Tf + Tm)
#
(26)
for  cFBm .







As mentioned above the couplesincome pooling imposes no extra constraint here, quite
the opposite, it ensures that the laissez-faire corresponds to the FB. In the general case,







In words, when ' is strictly concave, the pension scheme will induce the couple to
increase the retirement age of the female spouse and decrease that of the male spouse.
This is in line with the results presented above and particularly the property that when
' is su¢ ciently concave we will have  cFBf > 
cFB
m . Intuitively the concave ' calls
for redistribution towards the shorter-lived male. Since consumption levels are equal,
pension levels are ine¤ective for this purpose and the only way to mitigate the longevity
e¤ect is to increase female retirement age and decrease the male one. To sum up we
have:
Proposition 5 (FB pensions with couples) Because of the couples consumption
pooling, redistribution can be achieved only by distorting retirement ages. With a util-
itarian SW function, redistribution from men to women is not only optimal but also
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achieved in a decentralized way in the laissez-faire allocation. When the transforma-
tion is not too concave, redistribution from men to women remains optimal. When the
transformation is su¢ ciently concave, redistribution from women to men becomes op-
timal irrespective of the size of the wage gap. It requires the ranking of gender retirement
ages to be reversed.
5 Gender neutrality
As mentioned in the Introduction, according to Directive 2006/54/EC, social security
schemes should treat men and women equally, in particular with regard to their pension
benets. So far we have assumed that the benet scheme can be conditioned (tagged)
on the gender. The optimal tax literature has shown that tagging, that is conditioning
the transfer function on an exogenous and observable variable, is in general welfare
improving; see Cremer et al. (2012a) and the references provided there. However, it
may violate the principle of horizontal equity and thus be considered as unacceptable
as it may imply more or less arbitrary discrimination.
The previous sections have shown that, when this is possible, di¤erential treatment
of genders may indeed by optimal. In the singles case the implementing pension schemes
di¤ered across genders and with couples, spouses retirement choices a¤ect pension in
a gender-specic way. We now examine how the solution would be a¤ected if gender
neutrality is imposed in the sense that tagging is no longer possible. This does not
mean that men and women retire at the same age nor that they must obtain the same
net benets. It does mean, however, that they must be o¤ered the same options.
Consequently we do not rule out di¤erentiation across genders but the allocation must
be incentive compatible: the same menu of contracts must be o¤ered to men and women
who then self-select. In other words, gender neutrality e¤ectively means that the policy
has to be designed as if gender were not observable.
We look at contracts in the (; P ) space, where P is the pension net of contributions.
We assume that these are the observable variables. Note that we assume that per-period
consumption cs is not observable or rather cannot be specied in the contract because
18
this would violate gender neutrality.9 Dene






























for couples. We assume that pensions, notwithstanding gender neutrality, can be con-
ditioned on marital status.
5.1 Singles only
Indi¤erence curves in the (; P ) space may not be monotonic and it is not possible to
establish a single-crossing property, except in the special case where wf = wm. To
see that, consider Figure 1 that illustrates the prole of women and mens indi¤erence
curves in this case. The slope of an indi¤erence curve in the (; P ) space is the MRS












   wj ; for j = f;m: (29)
Equation (A.5) in Appendix E implies that when wages are equal we have MRSf <
MRSm at any given point. Hence, single crossing holds in this special case. However,
expressions (A.4)(A.5) show that this inequality may be reversed when wages di¤er.
Furthermore no general single-crossing property can be established.
9Directly controlling individual consumption levels would bring us back to gender tagging as c reveals
T and thus gender.
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Figure 1: Men and womens indi¤erence curves in the (; P ) space for Tf > Tm and
wf = wm:
5.1.1 Implementing gender neutrality for singles




































s.t. P sm + P
s







































 R( sf ); (sm);
(33)
where sj ; j = f;m; denotes the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the incentive
compatibility constraint of type j.
From Proposition 3 we know that the FB allocation implies redistribution from
male to female singles when the social welfare function is utilitarian. We can thus
conjecture that, when ' is close to linear, (33) is binding, so that we have sm > 0
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and sf = 0: To see this let us denote by subscripts mf and fm mimicking individuals




f )=Tm. When ' is linear, the FB






m ; which implies c
s
mf  csFBm ; so that the
incentive constraint (33) is violated. By continuity this will remain true when ' is not
too concave. On the other hand, when ' is su¢ ciently concave redistribution absent of
gender neutrality may be reversed so that we would have sm = 0 and 
s
f > 0 because
the FB allocation now violates the female incentive constraint.












   wj =MRSsj : (34)
5.1.2 Properties of the solution
We concentrate on the case where a single incentive constraint binds. We prove the
following Proposition in Appendix F.
Proposition 6 (Gender neutrality with singles) (i) If sm > 0 and 
s
f = 0 then
MRSsSBm = 0 so that P
0( sSBm ) = 0 and either (ia) or (ib) realizes:
(ia) 0 > MRSsSBf > MRS
sSB
mf
, P 0( sSBf ) < 0, csSBf < csmf < csSBm ,  sSBf <  sSBm and U sSBm > U sSBf ;
(ib) MRSsSBmf > MRS
sSB
f > 0, P 0( sSBf ) > 0, csmf > csSBm and  sSBf >  sSBm :
(ii) If sf > 0 and 
s
m = 0; then MRS
sSB
f = 0 so that P
0( sSBf ) = 0 and either (iia) or
(iib) realizes:
(iia) 0 > MRSsSBm > MRS
sSB
fm , P 0( sSBm ) < 0, csSBf > csSBfm and  sSBf >  sSBm ;
(iib) MRSsSBfm > MRS
sSB
m > 0
, P 0( sSBm ) > 0, csSBf < csfm < csSBm ,  sSBf <  sSBm , U sSBf > U sSBm :
where MRSsmf = R
0( sf )=u





m   P sf











The proposition shows that gender neutrality implies a distortion of the retirement
decisions. We have two possible regimes (i) and (ii) depending on the binding incentive
constraint. The regime determines whose choices will be distorted; for the other gender
we have the traditional no distortion at the top property. As usual in tax theory the sign
of the distortion hinges on the comparison of the MRS between mimicker and mimicked
individuals. However, its determination is more complex than in the standard model.
Since the indi¤erence curves are not monotonic they may intersect the increasing or the
decreasing part and this determines which subcase of the regime applies, (a) or (b).
As mentioned above regime (i) occurs when ' is linear or not too concave. When '
is su¢ ciently concave we may have regime (ii). As stated in the proposition, in regime
(i) the no distortion at the top property applies for the male. The sign of the distortion
for the female is ambiguous. However, from Figure 1 and expression (A.5) we know
that when wf = wm and sm > 0 case (ib) obtains. In words gender neutrality here
leads to a retirement age for female workers that is marginally larger than otherwise
optimal. In Appendix F, we also show that women retire later than men in this case.
This remains true by continuity when wages di¤er slightly but for a signicant wage
di¤erence the sign of the distortion does not appear to be unambiguous. Then case (ia)
may be relevant and the marginal distortion of female retirement age is negative. In
addition we show that women then actually retire earlier then men and that men have
a higher lifetime utility.
To sum up in both cases gender neutrality limits the possibilities of redistributing
from male to female singles. In case (ib) this leads to a larger retirement age for females
but the comparison between genderslifetime utilities is not clear. In case (ia), on the
other hand gender neutrality has an even more drastic e¤ect. While women continue to
retire earlier, they end up with a lower lifetime utility than men.
Let us now turn to regime (ii) which may be relevant when ' is su¢ ciently concave.
We know from the results presented in Subsection 4.1 that, when wages are equal, it will
occur for sure in the Rawlsian case (or when ' is su¢ ciently concave). Figure 1, or more
formally equation (A.5), then imply that subcase (iia) applies. The proposition here
shows that the direction of the marginal distortion (which applies now to the males) is
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reversed compared to case (ia) (which instead applies when wage are equal and social
welfare is linear) and women continue to retire later than men. In case (iib) when
indi¤erence curves intersect in the di¤erent direction, all inequalities are again reversed.
The bottom line is summarized by the following statement:
Proposition 7 (Redistribution accross singles under gender neutrality) With
singles only, gender neutrality hurts the gender towards whom redistribution is targeted
at the rst-best allocation.
5.2 Couples only
5.2.1 Implementing gender neutrality for couples
We now return to the case where all individuals live in couples. The optimal gender
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  2R( cf ); (cm)
(38)
The objective function and the incentive constraints all account for the fact that couples
pool their incomes. The problem di¤ers from its rst-best counterpart in that we have
added two incentive constraints which ensure gender neutrality. The rst constraint
(37), with multiplier cf ; is that of the female spouse while (38), with multiplier 
c
m;
applies to the male spouse.
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5.2.2 Properties of the solution
The following proposition is established in Appendix G.
Proposition 8 (Gender neutrality with couples) (i) The rst-best allocation de-
scribed in Proposition 4 is incentive compatible i¤  cFBf   cFBm .
(ii) If  cFBf > 
cFB
m , the second-best allocation entails the two incentive compatibility







Before turning to the interpretation recall that, since the couple pools its resources,
redistribution across genders is only possible via the retirement ages. In the laissez-
faire, men retire later than women. This remains true at the FB when ' is not too
concave but the retirement pattern will be reversed when ' is su¢ ciently concave.
Note that, as part of the proof, we show in Appendix G that there are two possible
patterns of binding incentive constraints. We have cf = 
c
m = 0 so that none of the
constraints binds and this corresponds to part (i) of the proposition. Alternatively, we
can have cf > 0 and 
c
m > 0 in which case both incentive constraints bind and we have
pooling. This corresponds to point (ii) of the proposition.
Intuitively these results are easily understood. When the FB implies  cFBf   cFBm ,
the couplesallocation di¤ers from the laissez-faire solution (as long a '00 < 0), but the
couple prefers this allocation to one where the female spouse would have to retire later
at  cm or the male spouse would have to retire earlier at 
c
f , that is the one achieved
by switchingretirement ages. Not surprisingly the proof shows that this would only
bring the couple further away from its preferred (laissez-faire) retirement ages.
On the other hand, when the FB implies  cFBf > 
cFB
m ; which reverses the laissez-
faire ranking, it cannot be implemented. Given the budget constraint, we have one
degree of freedom, namely P cSBf =  P cSBm but this is not in general su¢ cient to make
sure that the two incentive constraints are satised as equality; roughly we have two
equations with one unknown. The only feasible solution then implies  cSBf = 
cSB
m in
which case both incentives constraints are satised in a trivial way.
The main conclusion is that, with couplesconsumption pooling, gender neutrality
limits the possibilities to redistribute towards the shorter-lived male partner which here
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can only take place via retirement ages. The order of gender retirement ages cannot
be reversed under gender neutrality even when this would be otherwise desirable to
redistribute towards the shorter-lived individuals. When the FB calls for such a reversal,
the gender neutral solution implies pooling and thus equal retirement ages. As a result:
Proposition 9 (Redistribution under gender neutrality with couples) As long
as optimal redistribution in favor of the (shorter-lived) men is small so that the FB en-
tails a lower retirement age for female spouses, it can be implemented by a gender
neutral pension system. However, when optimal redistribution in favor of men is so
large that the FB entails a larger retirement age for women, gender neutrality restricts
the possibility to redistribute in favor of men.
5.2.3 Implementation
A direct implication of Proposition 8 is that in case (i) the results obtained for the FB













as long as '00 < 0. Recall that when ' is linear the rst best is implementable with
@P cf=@f = @P
c
m=@m = 0, and this result also applies here. Turning to case (ii), it also
follows directly from equations (25) and (26) that inequality (39) continues to apply.
To sum up, as long as ' is strictly concave there is always an upward distortion on the
retirement age of women and a downward distortion on that of men.
6 Numerical results
6.1 Calibration of the model
The following simulations illustrate our analytical results, provide a more precise de-
scription of the pension system and show which of the cases discussed are likely to arise
with empirically relevant parameter values both for the FB and for the gender-neutral
second best. We also quantify the size of transfers across groups and the impact of
gender neutrality on the di¤erent segments of the population: male and female singles
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and spouses. In addition, we now also study the case where singles and couples coexist.
The SW function is then given by the sum of (30) and (35) weighted by the propor-
tions of singles and couples in society. For the gender neutral solution we impose all
the incentive constraints considered before: (32)-(33) and (37)-(38). Since the policy
can be conditioned on individualsmarital status (there is tagging) this wont a¤ect the
qualitative results obtained within each group. However, the budget constraint is now
global, so that the solution may imply a transfer between singles and couples.
To calibrate the model, we proceed as follows. We assume that individuals start
their career at age 25. We set Tf = 60; Tm = 55; wm = 45000. Consequently women
and men live respectively until ages 85 and 80, with a longevity gap of ve years.
To calibrate the share of individuals living in couples, we use estimates and projec-
tions from the UN Population Division. Worldwide in 2020, 64% of women of reproduct-
ive age (15 to 49 years) were either married or in a cohabiting union; see Ortiz-Ospina
and Roser (2020). The percentage is lower for OECD countries. With life-spans starting
at the age of 25 the proportion of couples reported by the UN is likely to be underes-
timated. Consequently, we approximate the share of couples and singles, by 70% and






















The utility is specied as follows:
U = Tu (c)  bR ()
where
























so that " is the constant intertemporal elasticity of consumption, while  is the constant
Frish elasticity of labor supply. We set " = 1:2 and  = 1 following respectively Murphy
and Topel (2006) and Blundell et al. (2016).
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This leaves us with b and  to calibrate. We proceed in two steps. We rst calibrate
b so that a single man is indi¤erent between retiring at  sm = 40 and 
s
m = 41, which












in which  cancels out. Solving yields b = 0:19.
Second, in order to calibrate , we rst calculate the optimal retirement age for
a single man with a life-span of Tm and a lifetime labor income of wmm   e, where
e denotes the willingness to pay for an additional year of life at age 25; see below. For
such a worker, optimal retirement m is given by







which yields the following indirect utility function
V (Tm; e) = Tmu

wm
 (Tm; e)  e
Tm

  bR( (Tm; e)):
Now, e represents the willingness to pay for an additional year of life at age 25 if it
solves:
V (Tm; e) = V (Tm + 1; 0) : (42)










 (Tm + 1; 0)
Tm + 1

  bR( (Tm; e)) + bR( (Tm + 1; 0)):
Substituting from (40) and (41) and then solving yields  =  14:13.
We consider two scenarios concerning the degree of concavity of the SW function
specied by (10). In Scenario 1 we set v = 0:5 which is a relatively low value. It implies
that the concern for redistributing in favor of women, who are characterized by a lower
yearly income, is relatively stronger. In Scenario 2 we have v = 2; social welfare is more
concave and implies that the concern for redistributing in favor of the short-lived men
becomes relatively stronger.
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As mentioned in the Introduction, the gender wage gap amounts to 15% in Europe
(Eurostat 2020). Given that we set wm = 45000, this translates into a yearly female
income of wf = 38000. The 15% gap is expressed on a hourly basis and is thus likely
to underestimate the yearly gender gap in income, because women have a lower em-
ployment rate than men, work part-time more often and, have career interruptions due
to childbearing and child care. In other words, we set the wage gap in the low range
of the possible estimates. The results bear out that even with this low value the wage
gap turns out to be the dominant source of heterogeneity. In particular even with the
more concave SW function we continue to have redistribution from single males to single
women. This explains that an alternative setting with a wage gap of 20% yields similar
results.10
6.2 Scenario 1:  = 0:5
The results for the cases of singles and couples only are reported in Table 1. We omit
the levels of mens pension benets, Pm; which by the budget constraint, are simply
equal to  Pf .
Let us start from the laissez-faire for singles. Women retire later than men but
consume less. The rst best implies redistribution from men to women. In the rst
best women receive an implicit transfer and P sFBf =  P sFBm > 0. Moreover, single
women retire earlier and single men retire later than in the laissez-faire. When gender
neutrality is imposed, one can check that, as expected, ICmf binds for singles meaning
that single men are the mimickers. In the second-best allocation women receive a
lower implicit transfer than otherwise optimal. Retirement age is not distorted for
single men but it is upward distorted for women so that we obtain  s1SBf > 
s1SB
m ,
where the superscript s1SB indicates the second-best result of scenario 1 for singles
only. This implies that case (ib) of Proposition 6 applies. We conclude that, in this
scenario, gender neutrality dramatically impairs single women by decreasing the amount
of feasible redistribution. Indeed, the second best does not signicantly improve welfare
10We do not report them to avoid tedious repetitions but they can be obtained from the authors upon
request.
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LFs FBs SBs LFc FBc SBc
cf 26277 28654 26353 29722 29624 29624
Pf 0 252383 613 0 0 0
P 0f 0 0 187 0 1276 1276
cm 33135 30712 33129 29722 29624 29624
P 0m 0 0 0 0 -1540 -1540
f 41.49 38.60 41.59 37.44 38.80 38.80
m 40.49 43.14 40.50 44.33 42.93 42.93
Uf 951 1001 951 1022 1011 1011
Um 936 892 936 872 882 882
SWF 122.89 123.03 122.89 123 123 123
Table 1: Scenario 1 (low concavity of the SWF ): singles only and couples only.
compared to the laissez-faire, because the benet single women obtain from the slightly
larger per-period consumption is almost fully o¤set by the disutility from labor supply
generated by the increase in their retirement age. To sum up, in Scenario 1, with singles
only, gender neutrality is highly detrimental to women.
Let us now move to couples. As expected, in the laissez-faire spouses have the same
per-period consumption but women retire earlier than their partners. First best requires
redistribution from women to men that can only be achieved trough an adjustment of
retirement ages: female retirement age increases while male retirement age decreases
compared to the laissez-faire. However, in the rst best we continue to have  c1FBf <
 c1FBm which implies that the rst best is incentive compatible (Part (i) of Proposition
8 applies). In other words, the rst-best allocation can be implemented by a gender
neutral pension scheme. As a result, in Scenario 1 for couples only, gender neutrality
does not limit the extent of redistribution in favor of male spouses that the government
wants to achieve. In second best, female spouses are worse o¤ while male spouses are
better o¤ with respect to the laissez-faire. However this is not due to gender neutrality
but to the concavity of social welfare which calls for redistribution from female to male
spouses.
Let us move to an economy where singles and couples coexist so that both transfers
between men and women and transfers between singles and couples are possible. Within
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this context, both pension benets for single men and single women are relevant because
P sFBf 6=  P sFBm . In addition, for couples the total pension benet P c(= P cf + P cm)
matters here. Recall that before we had P c = 0; but when couples and singles coexist
the total pension benet for couples can be positive or negative: P c 7 0. The laissez-
faire remains of course the same as in the economy with only singles and only couples;
see Table 1.
The rst best implies that implicit transfers are paid by single men mainly in favor
of single women and to a lesser extent in favor of couples: P s1FBf = 251479 and
P c1FB = 803 are both positive while P s1FBm =  253307 is negative. Here the star in
the superscript (i.e. s1FB) indicates that singles and couples coexist in scenario 1.
However, in second best, couples receive a negative net pension benet and are the ones
who subsidize pensions of both single women and single men; we have indeed P c1SB =
 14255; P s1SBf = 17206 and P s1SBm = 15265. This occurs because, under gender
neutrality, ICmf binds for single men and this prevents the desirable redistribution
from single men to single women and to couples. In addition, no incentive constraint
binds in couples; thus the optimal redistribution in the couple can take place. Hence,
female spouses retire later while male spouses retire earlier than in the laissez-faire. On
the contrary, the retirement decisions of singles in the second best are similar to the ones
in laissez-faire: the retirement age of single women is slightly distorted upwards, while
the retirement age of single men is not distorted but slightly decreases with respect to
the laissez-faire because of the implicit transfer single men receive in the second best.
To conclude, in Scenario 1, in a mixed economy gender neutrality impairs both single
women and, to a lower extent, male spouses: it fully prevents optimal redistribution from
single men to couples and limits redistribution in favor of single women substantially.
6.3 Scenario 2:  = 2
We now consider a more concave social welfare function which reects a larger concern
for redistribution in favor of short-lived men. Obviously, this does not a¤ect the laissez-




 sf 38.61 41.39
P 0sf 0 181
P sf 251479 17206
 sm 43.15 40.33
csm 30703 33295
P s0m 0 0
Pm -253353 16055
 cf 38.80 38.88
P c0f 1275 1277





P sc 803 -14255
U sf 1001 954
U sm 892 939
U cf 1011 1009
U cm 882 881
SWF 123.028 122.98
Table 2: Scenario 1 (low concavity of the SWF ): singles and couples together.
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LFs FBs SBs LFc FBc SBc
cf 26277 27406 26344 29722 29542 29536
Pf 0 122075 598 0 0 0
P 0f 0 0 164 0 3793 3317
cm 33135 31943 33129 29722 29542 29536
P 0m 0 0 0 0 -4054 -3682
f 41.49 40.06 41.58 37.44 41.38 40.92
m 40.49 41.75 40.50 44.33 40.54 40.92
Uf 951 975 951 1022 990 994
Um 936 915 936 872 900 898
SWF -0.00211892 -0.00211682 -0.0021189 -0.00212477 -0.00211941 -0.00211948
Table 3: Scenario 2 (high concavity of the SWF ): either singles only or couples only.
Let us start with singles. Given that the concern for heterogeneity in life-span is
stronger, in the rst-best allocation single men are better o¤ while single women are
worse o¤ with respect to Scenario 1. Specically, single women should receive a lower
net pension benet (P s2FBf = 122075(=  P s2FBm ) < P s1FBf = 252383), enjoy a lower
per-period consumption and retire later than in Scenario 1. The opposite holds for
single men. Nevertheless, redistribution from men to women continues to be desirable
and this explains why, adding gender neutrality, single men are the mimicker and ICmf
still binds. As a result, in Scenario 2 for singles only, gender neutrality limits the
extend of feasible redistribution across singles individuals substantially and, in second
best, women receive an extremely low and suboptimal net pension benet.
Moving to couples only, as expected, we observe that the desired level of redistri-
bution from women to their spouses is larger than in Scenario 1. Now, the optimal
increase in female retirement age and the decrease in male retirement age are much
more pronounced than before and  c2FBf > 
c2FB
m holds. Part (ii) of Proposition 8 ap-
plies because both incentive constraints bind for couples here. Hence, gender neutrality
requires that both spouses retire at the same age ( c2SBf = 
c2SB
m ) and thus makes fe-
male spouses better o¤ with respect to the FB. To conclude, in Scenario 2 for couples
only, gender neutrality limits the extent of redistribution in favor of male spouses that
can be achieved.
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The FB with singles and couples is similar to its counterpart in Scenario 1, except
that the desired redistribution in favor of single women is lower, while the desired
redistribution in favor of male spouses is higher than in Scenario 1 because here the
concern for the short-lived man is stronger. As a result, in second best, male spouses
are better o¤ in the second scenario than in the rst one while the opposite holds for
single women. In the second-best setting, not much changes for singles with respect to
the rst scenario: single women continue to retire later than men, and the di¤erence
between retirement ages is the same in the two scenarios. However, in the second
scenario, both single men and women receive a lower transfer from couples than in the
rst scenario. The incentive constraint of single men continues to be binding.
In the rst best, coupless net pension benet is positive and amounts to P c2FBf =
2586 but, in the second best, it decreases dramatically and becomes negative, P c2SBf =
 4608. Like in the rst scenario couples should be net recipients in the rst best but
they are net contributors in the second best. The only signicant di¤erence between
the two scenarios is that the desired retirement age for female spouses in now larger
than that for male spouses in rst best ( c2FBf > 
2cFB
m ). Consequently, we obtain the
pooling regime described in Proposition 8 (ii) with  c2SBf = 
2cSB
m .
The qualitative conclusions of the rst scenario continue to apply, but e¤ects are
here mitigated by the more concave SW function. In Scenario 2, in the mixed economy
gender neutrality impairs single women and male spouses. It benets single men. It
partially prevents redistribution in favor of single women and reverses the direction of
the transfer between couples and singles resulting in negative net benets for couples.
7 Concluding comments
This paper has studied the design of pension schemes for male and female workers.
Pension benets net of contributions depend on the retirement age, which individuals
choose given the benet rule. Women live longer than men but have a lower wage.
Individuals can be single or live in couples. Couples pool their incomes and equalize




 sf 40.09 41.51
P 0sf 0 161
P sf 119195 5962
 sm 41.78 40.45
csm 31913 33183
P sm -125230 4791
P s0m 0 0
 cf 41.37 40.94
P c0f 3793 3317






U sf 975 952.
U sm 915 937
U cf 990 993
U cm 901 897
SWF -0.002118 -0.00219
Table 4: Scenario 2 (high concavity of the SWF ): singles and couples together.
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over an increasing concave transformation of individuals lifetime utilities in order to
introduce the concern for redistribution between individuals with di¤erent life-spans.
The following main lessons have emerged. First, the social planners concern for
redistribution between individuals with di¤erent life-spans plays a crucial role in de-
termining the desired direction of redistribution across genders and, thus, male and
female optimal retirement ages. Second, resource pooling by couples limits the possib-
ilities of gender redistribution via the level of net pension benets. Instead, retirement
ages, as determined by the specic design of the benet rules now play an even more
crucial role. Third, gender neutrality, though appealing on grounds of horizontal equity
comes at a welfare cost. It limits the possibilities to redistribute across genders and
may imply distortions of retirement ages. Depending on the specic case they may be
lower or higher than otherwise optimal.
Elaborating on the third point, we have shown that because gender neutrality limits
redistribution it negatively a¤ects the group towards which redistribution is targeted. In
turn, the gender and the marital status of the beneciaries of redistribution depend on
the concavity of the social welfare function. When the theoretical result is ambiguous,
we used our calibrated numerical examples to obtain empirically relevant predictions.
The impact of gender neutrality is most notable when there are singles only. In this case
singles women are the target of redistribution and we conclude that gender neutrality
limits such redistribution substantially.
Conversely, with a strictly concave social welfare function and a society only popu-
lated by couples, male spouses are always the target of redistribution and may therefore
be adversely a¤ected by gender neutrality. When the rst-best level of redistribution
towards male spouses is small, it can also be implemented under gender neutrality via an
appropriate adjustment of retirement ages. Here gender neutrality has no cost. When
instead the desired level of redistribution is so large that female workers would have to
retire later than their spouses, it cannot be implemented under gender neutrality. The
constrained pension scheme then involves pooling of retirement ages and redistribution
is limited by gender neutrality.
Finally, we have shown though our simulations that, in a setting with singles and
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couples, gender neutrality impairs both single women and male spouses: it dramatically
limits redistribution in favor of single women and reverses the direction of the transfer
between couples and singles resulting in negative net benets for couples. Overall female
spouses are not much a¤ected by gender neutrality because it has two opposite e¤ects.
On the one hand, it limits redistribution from women to men inside the couple, thus
making female spouses better o¤. On the other hand, it prevents redistribution in favor
of couples thus making female spouses worse o¤. To conclude, gender neutrality is
greatly advantageous to single men who should be the net contributorsin this setting
with singles and couples, but end up being net beneciaries.
Gender neutrality adds an extra constraint for the design of pension systems. In
a purely normative model such a constraint can only reduce overall welfare. However,
in reality horizontal equity requirements are often imposed as a safeguard against
arbitrary discrimination, particularly when policy decisions are determined by some
political process. From that perspective the advocates of gender neutrality may well be
inspired by the motivation to prevent arbitrary gender discrimination. Quite ironically,
though, our analysis has shown that gender neutrality is often detrimental to those it
allegedly is supposed to protect, and particularly to single women.
Redistribution across genders is motivated by both the longevity gap and the wage
gap. The two gaps may be decreasing but, as long as they continue to exist, some
redistribution across genders is welfare improving and gender neutrality brings about
the unintended consequences that our results have highlighted. Hence, until some re-
distribution across genders is desirable, the call for gender neutrality appears to be
premature. As we mentioned in the Introduction some derogations to gender neutrality
have been allowed to compensate for womens disadvantages in their professional life
and for the time they devoted to childcare. Such derogations mitigate the problem but
they may not be su¢ cient and represent just a patch for some of the issues. Anyway,
they remain mostly hypothetical as in reality only few EU Countries appear to have
adopted them.
This paper presents just a rst passat studying the overall issue. It needs to be
completed in di¤erent directions. In particular, we have neglected complementarities in
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leisure between spouses which in reality are likely to a¤ect couplesretirement decisions.
Furthermore, we have assumed that all persons of a given gender have the same wage.
In reality, however, pension schemes often redistribute also across income groups. When
wage heterogeneity is introduced gender and income redistribution become intertwined
problems and gender neutrality can be expected to have an even more drastic impact.
All these issue are on our research agenda.
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A Appendix
B First-best allocation, singles only: rst-order conditions
@L
@cf
= '0(U sf )Tfu




0(csm)  Tm = 0;
@L
@f
=  '0(U sf )R0( sf ) + wf = 0;
@L
@m
=  '0(U sm)R0( sm) + wm = 0:
C Proof of Proposition 2
The proof is by contradiction. Assume U sFBf < U
sFB
m so that '
0(U sFBf ) > '
0(U sFBm )
which, using (13), implies csFBf > c
sFB
m . Using (12), together with wf  wm, this
implies that  sFBf < 
sFB













A contradiction. The rst best solution thus involves U sFBf  U sFBm which by (13)
implies csFBm  csFBf .
Point (i): When ' is linear, (13) implies csFBf = c
sFB
m ; so that by (12) it yields
 sFBf < 
sFB
m .
Now when ' is Rawlsian, individual utilities are equalized i.e.:

















Point (ii). Assume that  sFBf   sFBm and ' is Rawlsian, then if wf = wm; (12)
yields csFBm  csFBf and thus U sFBf > U sFBm . This contradicts (A:1).
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Point (iii). Assume  sFBm  FBf and ' is Rawlsian, then if Tf = Tm = T , (12) yields
csFBm > c
sFB



















i.e. csFBm  csFBf so that we have a contradiction.
D Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is by contradiction. Assume
Uf < Um () '0(Uf ) > '0(Um): (A.2)
Since Tf  Tm and cm = cf = c, Uf < Um implies
f  m: (A.3)







From (22) ; the previous inequality implies R0(f ) < R0(m) and thus f < m; which
contradicts (A:3).
E Indi¤erence curves of singles






















Because of (A.6), the indi¤erence curves are U-Shaped in the (; P ) space. Since
@MRS=@T < 0, when wf = wm the two curves cross only once at a point where
MRSf < MRSm. Moreover, the point at which MRSf = MRSm = 0 lies south east
for female relative to male.
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F Proof of Proposition 6
Using the resource constraint (31), one has P sm =  P sf so that the problem of the





















































m   P sf
Tm










 R( sf ): (A.9)
Denoting sf and 
s
m the Lagrange multipliers respectively associated with A.8 and A.9,


























u0 (csm) + u
0  csmf = 0; (A.10)
wfu




0  csf R0   sf   sm wmu0  csmf R0   sf  = 0; (A.11)
wmu











m   P sf









=Tm. Using the denition



































MRSmf = 0; (A.14)
u0 (csm)MRSm
 








MRSfm = 0; (A.15)
where MRSsmf = R
0( sf )=u
0(csmf )  wm and MRSsfm = R0 ( sm) =u0(csfm)  wf .
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F.1 Proof of point (i)
Suppose that sm > 0 and 
s
f = 0. From (A:15), MRS
s
m = 0. Moreover, combining
(A:13) with (A:14) yields:
MRSsf =

















Recall that MRSsmf = R
0( sf )=u








Moreover, the binding self selection constraint (A:9) implies
R( sf ) R( sm) = Tm

u(csmf )  u (csm)

; (A.17)
so that two cases are possible:
(ia) either csmf < c
s




m which using (A:16) yieldsMRS
s
mf <
0 (and thus MRSsf < 0).
(ib) or csmf > c
s




m which using (A:16) yields MRS
s
mf > 0
(and thus MRSsf > 0).




f . Moreover, by (A:13),











F.2 Proof of point (ii)
Suppose that sf > 0 and 
s
m = 0. From (A:14), MRS
s
f = 0. Moreover, combining





























Remember that MRSsfm = R
0 ( sm) =u








Moreover, the binding self selection constraint (A:8) implies





























m   P sf
Tm
= csfm; (A.21)
so that 2 cases are possible:
(iia) Either csf > c
s




m which using (A:18) yields
MRSsfm < 0 (and thus MRS
s
m < 0).
(iib) or csf < c
s




m which using (A:18) yields MRS
s
fm > 0


















G Proof of Proposition 8
We prove the proposition by a succession of lemmas. In Lemma 1, we show that any rst-
best allocation can be implemented as long as  cFBf   cFBm with P cFBm = P cFBf = 0.
We then show in Lemma 2 that a constrained solution involves both incentive con-
straints to be binding. Then Lemma 3 proves that the constrained allocation cannot
be implemented with f > m so that a constrained solution implies  cSBf = 
cSB
m and
P cSBf = 0.
Lemma 1 Any rst-best allocation described in Proposition 4 is implementable if  cFBf 













where T = Tm+Tf . Consider a variation df =  dm, so that the female spouse chooses




0 (c) R0 (f )  wmu0 (c) +R0 (m) : (A.22)
Note that this expression is always negative when f > m. In other words, at any
allocation with f > m, couples would prefer a lower retirement age for women and a













and substituting R0(m)=u0(c) and R0(f )=u0(c) by their rst-best counterparts given by







wf   wm + wm
Tf'
0(U cFBf ) + Tm'
0(U cFBm )
'0(U cFBm ) (Tf + Tm)
  wf
Tf'
0(U cFBf ) + Tm'
0(U cFBm )
'0(U cFBf ) (Tf + Tm)
#
;






















Thus, by Proposition 4, dU cFB=df < 0 at any rst best allocation. Again, couples
would prefer a lower retirement age for women and a higher one for men.
Lemma 2 There are only two possible regimes. Regime 1 in which cf = 
c
m = 0 and
Regime 2 in which cf > 0 and 
c
m > 0.
Proof. The problem can be simplied in a drastic way by substituting for the budget
constraint into the problem, which amounts for instance to replacing Pm by  Pf . Omit-
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(wm + wf )f + 2Pf

  2R(f ): (A.24)
Denoting cf and 
c
m the Lagrange multipliers respectively associated with (A:23) and
(??), the FOC with respect to Pf then reduces to
cf2u
0(ccfm)  cm2u0(ccmf ) = 0;
where
cfm = (wm + wf )m=(Tm + Tf )  2Pf ; (A.25)
cmf = (wm + wf )f=(Tm + Tf ) + 2Pf : (A.26)
Consequently, we cannot have a solution where only one of the multipliers is strictly
positive. The two possible regimes are then Regime 1: cf = 
c
m = 0 which is the rst
best outcome. The regime 2 involves cf > 0 and 
c
m > 0.
Lemma 3 In Regime 2, one necessarily has  cSBf   cSBm .
Proof. Assume by contradiction that  cSBf > 
cSB
m . Since the two incentive compat-
ibility constraints (A:23) and (A:24) are binding, omitting the superscripts to simplify
notation one has:
R(f ) R(m) = (Tf + Tm) [u (c)  u (cmf )] ;
R( cf ) R( cm) = (Tf + Tm) [u (cfm)  u (c)] ;
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so that
cmf < c < cfm (A.27)
and
u (c) =
u (cfm) + u (cmf )
2
: (A.28)
Using (A:25) and (A:26) and rearranging yields:
u (c)=




x = wf (f   m) =(Tm + Tf )  y = wm (f   m) =(Tm + Tf ): (A.29)
By concavity of u (:) and inequality (A:27), equation (A:28) is satised if and only if
cfm   c > c  cmf which implies
x > y:
The previous inequality contradicts (A:29).
To sum up, we have shown that when  cFBf < 
cFB
m , the rst best can be decentral-
ized with P cSBm = P
cSB
f = 0. Whereas, when the two incentive compatibility constraints
bind,  cSBm = 
cSB
f holds, which necessarily implies cmf = cfm in order to satisfy (A:28)




m , the two incentive compatib-




f = 0. This completes the proof of
Proposition 8.
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